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I.

INTRODUCTION

Determining whether a particular worker should be classified as an employee
or an independent contractor currently depends heavily upon the specific
circumstances of employment. Although current legal approaches are meant to be
flexible, the open-endedness of the current tests means that many business owners
struggle with fitting their employees into the proper categories. A business that
misclassifies employees, whether in good faith or on purpose, will face expensive
penalties. In 2007, the state of California alone collected $163 million in back
taxes and penalties for independent contractor misclassifications. 1 Audits for such
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misclassifications are becoming more frequent, indicating that more and more
business owners struggle because of uncertainty in the law.2 Also, the number of
businesses using non-traditional work arrangements is increasing, meaning that
this problem is likely becoming more widespread. 3,4 Other studies indicate that the
more innovative a company is, the more likely it is to use non-traditional forms of
employment.5
This article proposes a workable legal standard for defining an independent
contractor—the step-back test, based on business practice and contract law. The
next sections of this article summarize current business considerations and legal
requirements before turning to the proposed standard. The independent contractor
model has been used throughout U.S. history, primarily for its flexibility and cost
advantages.6 In attempting to define the individual’s “degree of control,” current
legal requirements often conflate classification with enforcement. These two
functions need to be disentangled and focus concentrated on simplifying the
appropriate classification of workers.
No one disputes the existence of legal economic incentives for employers to
use independent contractors or the potential for abuse from misclassification of
bona fide employees as independent contractors. Previous scholarship on
independent contractor misclassification has thus focused almost entirely on the
problems that misclassified workers face. These concerns are real. But such
scholarship has almost entirely overlooked employers’ interests in keeping their
businesses and glosses over the core problem that employers face. The core
problem is that different government agencies use different factors in their
balancing tests, but the business owner bears the consequences for however the
owner resolves the dichotomy between employee and independent contractor.

Law. She served as a Note and Comment Editor on the Maryland Law Review. She is admitted to
practice in Maryland and the District of Columbia.
****The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect
the views of NFIB. The authors would like to thank Bill Rys for his helpful review and comments.
1
Cyndia Zwahlen, Independent Contractor Status Scrutinized, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2008, at 1,
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/apr/21/business/fi-smallbiz21.
2
Id. In California alone, the number of state audits climbed to 5,730 in the fiscal year ending June
30, 2007. Id. This number rose 54% over the course of three years. Id.
3
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau News, Businesses With No Paid Employees
Increase to 19.5 Million (July 30, 2006), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/
economic_census/cb06-115.html. The nation added nearly a million businesses with no paid employees
between 2003 and 2004 to reach 19.4 million, a growth rate of nearly 4.7 percent over a one year
period. Businesses without a payroll also make up more than 70 percent of the nation’s 27 million plus
firms, with annual receipts of $887 billion.
4
See, e.g., id. The nation added nearly a million businesses with no paid employees between 2003
and 2004 to reach 19.4 million, a growth rate of nearly 4.7% over a one year period. Businesses
without a payroll also make up more than 70% of the nation’s 27 million plus firms, with annual
receipts of $887 billion. Id.
5
See Nick Kratzer, Employment Organization and Innovation – Flexibility and Security in
Virtualized Companies, 17(1) TECH. ANALYSIS & STRATEGIC MGMT. 35, 38 (2005) (describing an
investigation conducted in West Germany which showed that companies that successfully carried out
process or product innovations displayed substantially higher levels of atypical forms of employment,
including contract work, part-time work, freelance work, or temporary employment).
6
See Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When it Sees One and How it
Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 337 (2001).
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For example, the Government Accountability Office’s July 2006 report
recommends that the Department of Labor (“DOL”) share potential employee
misclassifications with “appropriate federal and state programs” rather than
limiting discussions between the DOL and a business owner to enforcement of the
Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)7.8
The DOL agrees with this
recommendation, which would leave the business owner vulnerable to a Pandora’s
Box of legal challenges from a host of agencies – each with its own definitions of
employee and independent contractor.9 A straightforward test ex ante would
simplify the enforcement task ex post for both the government and the business
owner. To that end, this article proposes a single-factor legal test for
distinguishing between an employee and an independent contractor by recognizing
business considerations as well as legal requirements.
II.

BUSINESS CONSIDERATIONS

Employers and individuals are the two parties to both employment and
independent contracting arrangements. Scholars traditionally categorize workers
in one of two categories, which are based on the employer’s needs and actions:10
Traditional or core workers: individuals hired on a permanent full-time or part-time
basis with an understanding of continuous employment.
Contingent workers: individuals who lack a contract for long term employment and
whose minimum hours may vary at random. 11,12 Contingent workers include
temporary-help firm workers (hired via an explicit short-term contract with an
intermediate organization), in-house temporaries (hired directly by the employer
“to meet short-term or variable scheduling needs”), and independent contractors
(“self-employed workers who are brought into an organization to provide specific
skills”).13

This article focuses on a subgroup of the latter category, the independent
contractor.
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (“BLS”), 89.1% of the U.S.
workforce was in “traditional employment arrangements” as of February 2005.14
The number of independent contractors has risen from 6.4% of the workforce in

7

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C., ch. 8. (2004).
U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS: IMPROVED OUTREACH
COULD HELP ENSURE PROPER WORKER CLASSIFICATION, GAO-06-656 at 4, 35-36 (July 2006).
9
Id. at 4.
10
Daniel G. Gallagher & Magnus Sverke, Contingent Employment Contracts: Are Existing
Employment Theories Still Relevant?, 26(2) ECON. & INDUS. DEMOCRACY 181, 186-87 (2005); see also
Kratzer, supra note 5, Fig. 1 (listing categories of contingent workers).
11
Gallagher, supra note 6 at 187 (citing A. E. Polivka & T. Nardone, The Definition of Contingent
Work, 112 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 9, 11 (1989)).
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CHARTING THE U.S. LABOR MARKET IN
2005, Chart 3-5 (June 2006), USDL 05-1433, http://www.bls.gov/cps/labor2005/chartbook.pdf. The
BLS also reports that, “[m]ore than half of the 226 million persons in the civilian non-institutional
working-age population in 2005 were employed full time.” Id. at Chart 1-1.
8
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February 2001 to 7.4% (10.3 million people) in February 2005. 15 Although the
percentage of the U.S. workforce classified as independent contractors has
remained under 10% since BLS first collected these statistics in 1995, there has
been a 25.4% increase in the number of independent contractors from February
1999 to February 2005.16,17 The definition of independent contractor is relevant at
global, national, and individual levels of analysis.
According to a 2008 survey of small business owners, 61% of respondents
had hired independent contractors within the past twelve months to perform
construction, transportation, or computer work. 18 Within these areas, there are
many additional jobs that are likely to be contracted out such as catering,
automotive repair, and building maintenance. Thus, the overall impact of
independent contractors on the economy becomes clear. 19
Globally, businesses are incorporating non-traditional work arrangements in
order to be flexible.20 Independent contractors form part of the cohort of workers
worldwide that seek alternative and flexible work practices. This trend has been
tracked by the Organization for Economic Development (“OECD”) in its 1994
Jobs Study and subsequent updates.21 The OECD’s 1999 Employment Outlook
found that businesses “in different countries use flexible working practices to a

15
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CONTINGENT AND ALTERNATIVE
EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS (2005), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/conemp.nr0 .htm.
16
GAO-06-656, supra note 8 App. III, Tbl. 4 (showing changes in the size of the contingent
workforce).
17
Id.
18
William J. Dennis, Independent Contractors, 8 NFIB NAT’L SMALL BUS. POLL 6, at 1, 7 (2008),
http://www.411sbfacts.com/files/SBP_V8I6_IndyContract_1_6.pdf.
19
Id.
20
Arne L. Kalleberg, Nonstandard Employment Relations: Part-Time, Temporary and Contract
Work, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 341, 356 (2000). Kalleberg cites several reasons. First, global economic
changes increased competition and uncertainty among firms and put greater pressure on them to push
for greater profits and to be more flexible in contracting with employees. Id. Second, sluggish
economic growth, particularly in Europe, made the hiring of more part-time and flexible workers
attractive to many firms. Id. Third, the evolution of technologies that made it easier to organize
temporary workers contributed to this shift. Id. Fourth, the growth of labor and employment codes
designed to protect permanent workers made hiring temporary workers or independent contractors more
attractive. Id. Fifth, many older workers and married women – groups that often prefer less traditional
working arrangements – are increasingly joining the workforce. Id.
21
ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., THE OECD JOBS STUDY: FACTS, ANALYSIS,
STRATEGIES (1994), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/51/1941679.pdf.
Less rigid arrangements for daily, weekly, annual and life-time working hours
could meet both enterprise requirements and worker aspirations. They would
permit firms better to exploit their productive capacities by matching production
more closely to shifts in demand. Workers and their families would also gain
from new working-time arrangements tailored to their individual preferences or
family circumstances. The type of working-time flexibility sought by firms may
not always coincide with the aspirations of workers. The best way to resolve such
conflicts is through negotiated solutions at de-centralised [sic] levels. In some
countries legislative changes and changes to taxation and social security
provisions would also be needed. One important attraction of greater work-time
flexibility is its potential to integrate working-time reductions with new patterns
of life-long learning. More flexible working-time arrangements would also
facilitate greater lifetime participation of women.
Id.
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significantly different extent”; however, there was no suggestion “that increased
use of flexible working practices necessarily leads to a growing polarisation [sic]
between ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ workers.”22
Countries that follow the common law tradition, such as the U.S., encourage
organizations to be flexible by permitting employment at-will and by providing a
lesser degree of employee protection than is found in Europe. The law of
classifying independent contractors evolved slowly from the Anglo-American
common law of agency, specifically the master-servant relationship.23 Disparities
between countries that follow the common law system and those that have
different legal traditions have generated international discussions of employment
policy.24
Defining the employment relationship is important at the national level
because U.S. employers: (1) incur costlier legal obligations (e.g., contributions
toward employee income taxes, Social Security, unemployment and workers’
compensation, overtime, and pensions) and assume greater tort liability when they
hire employees rather than using independent contractors;25 and (2) risk substantial
penalties for misclassifying an employee as an independent contractor.26 U.S.
businesses, like their global counterparts, are experimenting with non-traditional
work arrangements in order to maximize flexibility. 27 In doing so, U.S. businesses
require a clear definition of independent contractor in order to satisfy legal
obligations.
Thus, successful use of independent contractors in business blurs the line
between outside contractor and inside employee (i.e., peripheral and core
individuals), thereby increasing the likelihood of misclassification. Classifying
individuals as independent contractors versus employees is antithetical to the
employer’s need to have everyone perform as a coordinated unit. 28 Technological

22
ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK 1999: CH. 4, NEW
ENTERPRISE WORK PRACTICES AND THEIR LABOUR MARKET IMPLICATIONS ch. 4, (June 24, 1999),
http://www.oecd .org/dataoecd/9/2/2080019.pdf.
23
See Carlson, supra note 6 at 302 (discussing the pre-industrial origins of worker classification, in
particular the master-servant relationship).
24
See, e.g., INT’L LABOUR ORG. (“ILO”), R198 EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP RECOMMENDATION
(2006) http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?R198.
25
Employers who hire independent contractors for especially dangerous work typically do not
have a reduced risk of tort liability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427 (1965).
26
In the case of a negligent failure to withhold income tax, the employer is subject to a penalty of
1.5% of income paid, plus income compounded daily. If a failure to pay Social Security taxes is
classified as “willful,” the employer is subject to the penalty of paying the employer share of Social
Security and unemployment taxes, as well as a penalty equal to 5% of the tax for each month of the
failure to pay, up to a maximum of 25% of the tax. For failure to pay employment taxes, the employer
is subject to the penalty of 0.5% of the tax, for each month of the failure to pay, up to a maximum of
25% of the tax.
27
See, e.g, THE GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CTR, FLEXIBLE WORK ARRANGEMENTS: THE FACT
SHEET, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/workplaceflexibility2010/definition/general/FWA_FactSheet.
pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2009). The percentage of the workforce that works a flexible schedule
increased dramatically from 1985 to 1997 and has since leveled off. Id. In 1985, 12.4% of the working
population worked on a flexible schedule, compared to 27.6% in 1979 and 27.5% in 2004. Id. at 2.
28
See, e.g., Independent Contractor Status: Hearing Before the House Committee on Small
Business, 104th Cong., 22 (1995) (testimony of Don Owen, drywall contractor representing the
Associated Builders and Contractors):
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advances further encourage flexible, or even “virtual,” employment
arrangements.29 Workers can be off-site and still perform essential tasks.
Vague definitions impose costs and risks on individuals as well as business
owners. “When employers have misclassified workers as independent contractors,
workers may need to go to court to establish their employee status and their
eligibility for protection under the laws.”30 Alternatively, the individual may not
recognize him or herself as an independent contractor and fail to pay the full
amount of his or her federal tax contributions. “Businesses without a payroll make
up more than 70 percent of the nation’s 27 million-plus firms, with annual receipts
over $887 billion.”31 Nevertheless, the BLS’ Current Population Surveys (“CPS”)
found that, “[a]n additional 5% to 6% of CPS respondents identified themselves as
self-employed but not independent contractors in [1995 and 1997], suggesting that
there is not a perfect correspondence between people’s understanding of these two
work arrangements.”32
The nature of the work arrangement may explain some of the confusion.
Currently, independent contractors and temporary workers are both classified as
contingent workers, yet expectations by both employers and individuals differ
between them.
Public policy does not require treating all categories of contingent workers in
the same way.33 Independent contracting affords personal flexibility. As
acknowledged by the BLS, “[f]ewer than 1 in 10 independent contractors said they
would prefer a traditional work arrangement.”34 Individuals who opt for
independent contracting – who “tend to be older, highly educated individuals who
work in relatively high-paying management, business, and financial operations
occupations” – have a strong desire to preserve personal choice in arranging the
conditions of their employment. 35 Nevertheless, some workforce protection laws
(e.g., sexual harassment, anti-discrimination) transcend the contractual relationship
to address societal concerns.36
Today, for many workers, “the emphasis is on building up a portfolio of

Construction projects are like football games. There must be instructions, there
must be control, and there must be integration in order to properly sequence the
work. All subcontractors, regardless of size, have to work in harmony and
therefore must work under a clear plan or schedule. A delicate balance must be
struck to avoid misclassification of these individuals when they are simply
carrying out their duty to build the project.
Id.
Id.
30
GAO-06-656, supra note 8 at 21.
31
Press Release, supra note 3.
32
Kalleberg, supra note 20 at 356.
33
GAO-06-656, supra note 8 at 23.
34
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS IN 2005
(July 29, 2005), http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2005/jul/wk4/art05.htm.
35
CONTINGENT AND ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 15 at 4; see also
GAO-06-656, supra note 8, App. III, Tbl. 5 (listing characteristics of contingent workers).
36
Hugh Collins, Independent Contractors and the Challenge of Vertical Disintegration to
Employment Protection Laws, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 353, 355 (1990); see also GAO-06-656,
supra note 8 at 21-22, fig. 5 (listing key laws designed to protect workers).
29
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experiences that keep the individual attractive in the marketplace.”37 As the
marketplace changes, employers and individuals find lower costs and increased
satisfaction in using the independent contracting model rather than traditional
employment arrangements. In practice, effective organizations cannot maintain an
artificial distinction between core employees and peripheral contractors. The lack
of a clear definition of independent contractor leaves the individual vulnerable to a
lack of employment protections (and traditional benefits such as health insurance
and pension plan) and increases the business owner’s risks from
misclassification.38 The common law’s traditional emphases on employment atwill and preservation of personal choice suggest that courts should look primarily
at the contract to determine each party’s expectations regarding the nature of the
commitment; however, public policy mandates safeguards. The next section
reviews the legal definitions of independent contractors at the federal and state
levels before proposing a workable standard for defining independent contractors.
III. LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
As businesses in the U.S. and globally experiment with different types of
work arrangements, U.S. law has attempted to define non-traditional work
relationships. The primacy of the contract in defining employment relationships
goes back to the nineteenth century.39 Given the common law’s endorsement of
private contracting and adherence to employment-at-will, the U.S. legal system has
struggled with the distinction between employer and independent contractor rather
than starting with an ILO-type presumption of employment. 40
The U.S. and other legal systems have relied heavily on factor tests to
capture the low – versus high – performance ambiguity construct described in the
previous section (e.g., prescribed hours of work, work done on employer’s
premises, ability to work simultaneously for multiple employers). State and
federal governments have thus used several different tests to address the problem,
among them the common law right to control and economic reality tests, the
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) approach,41 and the ABC Test.42 But significant

37
Bendapudi et al., Nonstandard Employment Arrangements: A Proposed Typology and Policy
Planning Framework, 26 HUM. RESOURCE PLAN. 37 (2003).
38
See Carlson, supra note 6 at 337.
39
See, e.g., Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-19 (1884) (“[M]en must be left,
without interference to buy and sell where they please, and to discharge or retain employees at will for
good cause or for no cause, or even for bad cause without thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per
se. It is a right which an employee may exercise in the same way, to the same extent, for the same cause
or want of cause as the employer.”) (emphasis added).
40
See generally Carlson, supra note 17 (providing a historical overview of classification schemes
and an evaluation of current legal tests for classification).
41
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TOPIC 762 – INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR VS. EMPLOYEE,
available at http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc762.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2009); see also INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV. PUBLICATION 1779 INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR OR EMPLOYEE (2005), http://www.irs.
gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1779.pdf; see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. FORM SS-8, DETERMINATION OF
WORKER STATUS FOR PURPOSES OF FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT TAXES AND INCOME TAX WITHHOLDING,
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/fss8.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2009).
42
See INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR STATUS: STATE BY STATE LEGAL GUIDE 9 (Robert W. Wood
ed., 1993).
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problems have arisen from this piecemeal approach. First, one particular worker
might be an employee under a test used by one arm of government and an
independent contractor under the test used by another, creating significant
confusion and uncertainty for employers. 43 Second, reasonable minds can differ
over interpreting and weighting the factors, exacerbating employer uncertainty. 44
This section of the article examines the major strengths and weaknesses of
three of the most common independent contractor classification tests: (1) the
common law approaches; (2) the IRS approach; and (3) the ABC Test.
A. Common Law Approaches (Right to Control and Economic Reality
Tests)
The common law definition of independent contractor has two approaches,
the right to control test and the economic reality test. 45 The “right to control”
looks at the control the employer has over the employee but not over an
independent contractor, focusing on the employer’s right to direct the means of
production.46 The common law “right to control” test is used by courts to
determine employee status in various types of cases, including employment
discrimination and benefits cases, tax cases, and tort (wrongful act) liability cases.
This approach to classification stems from the agency law definition of
employee,47 and relies on a thorough investigation of the facts of each case. This
test generally gives employers more latitude to classify workers as independent
contractors than do other legal approaches.48
The economic reality test is based on financial issues, in particular the
investment and risk the worker has in the business.49 The economic reality test, in
some variation, is used to classify workers under the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 (“FLSA”), Equal Pay Act of 1963, Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
(“FMLA”), and the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (“EPPA”).50 The
United States DOL uses the “economic reality test” to determine coverage under,
and compliance with, the minimum wage and overtime requirements of the
FLSA.51 The following are among the factors considered by the DOL: (1) the
degree of control exercised by the hiring party over the manner in which the work
is performed; (2) the relative investments by the hiring party and the worker in

43

See Carlson, supra note 6 at 301.
Befort, infra note 49, at 167.
45
See ROBERT WOOD, LEGAL GUIDE TO INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR STATUS 6 (John Wiley &
Sons, 2d ed. 1992).
46
Id.
47
See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Hearst Publ’n, 322 U.S. 111, 120-21 (1944) (discussing the
development of the definition of independent contractors in agency law from vicarious liability cases
involving workers).
48
See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting the Black Hole of Workplace Regulation: A Historical
and Comparative Perspective of Contingent Work, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 166 (2003).
49
WOOD, supra note 34 at 12.
50
See MICHAEL S. HORNE, THE CONTINGENT WORKFORCE: BUSINESS AND LEGAL STRATEGIES §
4.07 (2005).
51
See id.
44
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materials and equipment; (3) the degree to which the worker’s opportunity for
profit and loss is determined by the hiring party or the worker’s own managerial
skill; (4) the skill and initiative required in performing the job; (5) the permanency
of the relationship; and (6) whether the service is an integral part of the hiring
party’s business.52
The Supreme Court first formulated the economic reality test when, in 1944,
the Court held that the meaning of “employee,” as used in the National Labor
Relations Act, must, in doubtful situations, be determined broadly by underlying
economic facts rather than technically and exclusively by previously established
legal classifications.53 Three years later, in United States v. Silk, the Court used
financial considerations in classifying workers as employees under the Social
Security Act.54 The Court held that determining whether or not the employees
were integral to the employer’s work is crucial for employee classification
purposes.55 Concerned that the Court’s economic reality definition would be too
vague, encompass every worker, and bankrupt the Social Security system,
Congress passed the Gearhart Resolution. 56 In the resolution, Congress articulated
its preference for the common law definition, but did not reject the Court’s use of
economic factors in making a characterization .57 Despite the use of the more farreaching economic reality test for certain labor protection laws, the controlling
standard for most classification purposes remains the common law right to control
test.58
“During the 1970s and 1980s, most federal courts of appeal adopted a
‘hybrid’ test for determining employee status under federal discrimination statutes
[which] combines elements of the common law and economic realities tests.”59
Under the hybrid approach, courts examine the economic realities of the work
relationship but place emphasis on “the employer’s right to control the ‘means and
manner’ of the worker’s performance.”60 Despite the growing popularity of the
hybrid test, the Supreme Court reinvigorated the common law standard in its 1992
decision in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, which addressed how
Employment Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) defined employee
status.61 In that case, the Court declined to use the hybrid test and instead adopted
52

WOOD, supra note 34 at 132.
Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 322 U.S. at 129.
54
United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 711-12 (1947).
55
See id. at 714-16; see also Orley Lobel, The Four Pillars of Work Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1539,
1554 (2006). “In the mid-1990s, the Dunlop Commission on the Future of Worker-Management
Relations called for ‘the definition of employee in labor, employment, and tax law [to] be modernized,
simplified, and standardized.’” Id. The Commission recommended that, “instead of the multi-factored
control test of master-servant common law, courts and regulators should move to economic realities.”
Id.
56
Gearhart Resolution, 62 Stat. 468 (1949).
57
Wood, supra note 34, at 7. See also Social Security discussion below.
58
Id. at 1.
59
Befort, supra note 48, at 167.
60
Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see also Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm’n v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32, 38 (3d Cir. 1983) (applying the hybrid test to
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) claims).
61
See generally Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992).
53
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a thirteen factor formulation of the common law test. 62 Following the Darden
decisions, many courts again began to apply the more traditional common law test
even outside the ERISA context.63 However, the Darden test remains problematic,
as employers struggle with applying its thirteen factors consistently. 64 As Stephen
Befort noted, any test with thirteen variables is bound to have “considerable play in
the joints.”65
B. The ABC Test
For purposes of state unemployment taxes, most states use the “ABC Test”,
which is very broad and includes most workers. 66 The ABC Test requires the
employer to prove three factors to show that the worker is an independent
contractor: a) the worker is free from control or direction in the performance of the
work; b) the work is done outside the usual course of the firm’s business and is
done off the premises of the business; and c) the worker is customarily engaged in
an independent trade, occupation, profession, or business. 67
The ABC Test has several attractive features. First, it is simpler than the IRS
or the common law test; it is easier for employers to apply three factors than it is to
apply thirteen or twenty. Second, it creates a presumption of employment, making
it more difficult for unscrupulous employers to misclassify employees as
independent contractors to avoid legal obligations.68
The ABC Test also has some negative features. First, some workers who are
employees under a state ABC Test may be independent contractors under federal
statutes. This disparity creates confusion for employers and workers alike. 69
Second, by creating the presumption of employment, the ABC Test makes it harder
for employers to create unconventional employment relationships with workers. 70
If faced with the possibility of hiring either an individual protected by the entire
panoply of employment laws or not hiring anyone at all, some employers might
simply choose the latter.71 In such situations, adopting the seemingly worker
62

Id.
Befort, supra note 48, at 167 (citing Lambertsen v. Utah Dep’t of Corrections, 79 F.3d 1024,
1028 (10th Cir. 1996) “favoring common law test for Title VII claim, but finding that because the
common law and hybrid tests are so similar, the lower court did not commit reversible error by applying
the latter standard”); compare Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1993) (adopting the
common law test for ADEA claims).
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
See INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR STATUS, supra note 42 at 9.
67
Id. at 9-10.
68
See Elizabeth Wyman, Applying the ‘ABC Test’ To Determine Liability for Unemployment
Compensation, 19 ME. B. J. 38 (2004).
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
See, e.g., Maria O’Brien Hylton, The Case Against Regulating the Market for Contingent
Employment, 52 WASH & LEE L. REV. 849, 858 (1995) (“Alternatively, an employer facing increased
labor costs associated with hiring contingent workers may do what Professor Kalleberg would like to
see done - reduce the number of contingent employees. There is no guarantee, however, that the
employer would substitute core workers for contingent workers under these circumstances. If the
employer did elect to consolidate the work of several contingent employees into one core worker, one
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friendly ABC Test may actually harm employees.
C. The IRS Test
At the federal level, the IRS identified twenty factors in its Revenue Ruling
87-4172 to distinguish between employee and independent contractor based upon
the common law.73 It now categorizes these factors as evidence of behavioral
control, financial control, and type of relationship. 74 The IRS provides a three
page document, Form SS-8, for an ex ante determination of the worker’s status75
and limited relief for the reasonable and consistent misclassification of certain
employees.76
Three problems arise with the IRS approach. First, as with the Darden test,
the compliance costs of completing Form SS-8 are burdensome and limit employer
flexibility. The IRS estimates the average amount of time for completing and
filing Form SS-8 to be just under twenty four hours.77 Second, although the IRS
scheme identifies relevant factors of the employment, contractual, or agency
relationship, the subjective factors are susceptible to competing, yet justifiable,
interpretations. This point will be illustrated in the cases discussed below. Third,
IRS rules technically apply only to issues of federal employment taxes and income
tax withholding. Other federal statutes and agencies use other approaches. For
example, the FMLA of 1993 uses the number of hours worked as a criterion for
defining “eligible employee.”78 The U.S. DOL enforces minimum wage and
overtime requirements, among other laws, using the definition of “employee”
found in the FLSA.79 Under the FLSA, with exceptions for people who volunteer
or work for public agencies or in some agricultural roles, “the term ‘employee’
means any individual employed by an employer.”80 Without a consistent
definition of “employee,” it is impossible to have a consistent definition of
“independent contractor.”
State statutes and agencies compound the inconsistencies found at the federal
level. Whereas federal legislation is relatively newer than state legislation and
starts with a broad definition of employee in the FLSA, employment law
traditionally fell under each state’s purview and emphasized private contracting.
must still inquire as to whether this is a desirable outcome. A conclusion that this is a superior outcome
requires one to accept that the current full-time employment of one core employee and the simultaneous
unemployment of several formerly contingent employees are more attractive than the contingent
employment of all of them. Given how little we can say about the subjective desirability of contingent
employment, such a conclusion does not appear warranted.”). Id.
72
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., REV. RUL. 87-41 (Jan. 1987), at 11-18.
73
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 15-A, EMPLOYER’S SUPPLEMENTAL TAX GUIDE
(SUPPLEMENT TO PUBLICATION 15 (CIRCULAR E), EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE) 6-7 (rev. Jan. 2006), http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p15a.pdf.
74
See supra note 41.
75
Supra note 41.
76
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 58 at 5-6; see also 26 U.S.C. § 3509 (2000).
77
Id. at 5.
78
29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A)(ii) (2000).
79
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1938).
80
29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (2000).
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From colonial times through the expanding republic of the nineteenth century, state
courts embraced the entirety doctrine with regard to employment contracts. 81 The
entirety doctrine required individuals to perform all contractual terms in full or
forfeit all compensation.82 Around the mid-nineteenth century, courts started to
acknowledge that the entirety doctrine could unjustly enrich employers who, for
example, fired employees one day short of the contract’s termination date.83
Although recognizing legitimate grounds for breach of an employment contract,
state courts favored performance over compensation.84
These two streams – the federal public policy objective of broad employee
protection that originated in the New Deal era and the states’ longstanding
encouragement of employment-at-will and enforcement of private contracts –
inform the current conundrum over defining employees and independent
contractors. These conflicting traditions make it unlikely that the U.S. could adopt
the ILO suggested presumption in favor of employment wholesale without
acknowledging independent contractors’ personal work preferences and
employers’ flexible work arrangements.
The U.S. federal and state levels do share an interest in encouraging
employers to innovate, which, in turn, blurs the demarcation between traditional
employee and independent contractor. The former distinction between core and
peripheral employees is fading fast and regulations do not adequately capture the
new configurations. Before turning to the single factor test that this article
proposes, it is worthwhile to examine two legal cases against existing standards
and vis-à-vis the proposed single standard. The following two lawsuits illustrate
the applications and shortcomings of existing factor tests, the variability among
state laws, and the difficulties posed by current definitions of employee versus
independent contractor.
D. Two Case Illustrations
Federal Express
Federal Express Ground Package System, Inc. (“FedEx Ground”) and its
division, Fed Ex Home Delivery (“FHD”) have been involved in a spate of legal
contests regarding the company’s classification of its drivers as independent
contractors.85 The company has faced class action as well as individual claims
before the IRS, regional divisions of the National Labor Relations Board
(“NLRB”), the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, the Los

81
ROBERT J. STEINFELD, COERCION, CONTRACT, AND FREE LABOR IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
290-314 (2001).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., & Local 177, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, AFL-CIO, N.L.R.B.
Case 22-RC-12508 (Nov. 2, 2004); FedEx Home Delivery & Teamsters Local 24, N.L.R.B. Cases 1RC-22034, 22035 (Sept. 20, 2006); Cal. Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., Sacramento Office, Case No.
1617957, Hearing on April 27, 2006; Estrada v. FedEx Ground, No. BC 210130 (L.A. Super. Ct. July
26, 2004).
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Angeles Superior Court, and other forums. 86 Each agency or court has first had to
answer the question whether pick-up and delivery (“P&D”) drivers were
employees or independent contractors before addressing the specific claims
regarding payment of unemployment taxes,87 the establishment of union
representation,88 eligibility for unemployment benefits,89 or responsibility for
operating expenses.90 Recently (summer 2009), the federal district court for the
northern district of Indiana ruled on motions to certify class actions in the
consolidated multi-district litigation, In re Fed Ex Ground Package System, Inc.,
Employment Practices Litigation.91
Each agency or court referred to its own precedents in examining the
individual’s relationship to FedEx Ground. The degree of control each plaintiff
had over how work was done featured prominently in the analyses. Common
factors of the analyses included: the individual’s tenure with the company;
required use of the FedEx logo on vans, wearing of FedEx-approved uniforms, and
use of FedEx scanners; rights of FedEx to inspect the individual’s equipment and
to approve of drivers or workers hired by the individual; specifications regarding
schedules, reports, and routes; and freedom to terminate the contract. Each of the
decisions referenced above found that the individuals were employees of FedEx
Ground.
FedEx Ground’s difficulties lay in the structure of its business operations and
in the drivers’ contracts it inherited from its predecessor, Roadway Package
Systems (RPS). The Estrada court found a distinction between drivers who had
single routes (employees) and those with multiple routes (independent
contractors).92 From the company’s perspective, “of importance to the court is the
clear evidence that [single route drivers] are totally integrated into the [FedEx
Ground] operation . . . if ‘lightning’ were to strike and there were suddenly no
[single route drivers], [FedEx Ground] would lose its principal means of pick up
and delivery.”93 From a single route driver’s perspective,
there is little or no opportunity for profit or loss as a [single route driver], but . . .
there are tremendous opportunities in this regard for [multiple route drivers]. . . .
Unlike the [single route driver], who in effect is just a package pick up and delivery
person, a [multiple route driver] has the opportunity to hire drivers and slowly but

86

Id.
Letter from Gail Lontine, SS-8 Program Coordinator, IRS SB/SE Compliance, BIRSC, SS-8
Unit, Case # 37653, (July 12, 2006) (advising Ms. Sharon Pagels that the IRS considered her to be an
employee of FedEx Ground).
88
See, e.g., FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., supra note 85, Case 22-RC-12508 (Nov. 2, 2004);
Cases 1-RC-22034, 22035 (Sept. 20, 2006).
89
Case No. 1617957, supra note 85 (finding Jerrett W. Henderson was an employee of FHD).
90
No. BC 210130, supra note 85. The court subsequently awarded $5.3 million in damages to
single route drivers who had borne operating expenses. U.S. Newswire Corp., AP ONLINE, June 3,
2006.
91
See In re Fed Ex Ground Package System, Inc., Employment Practices Litigation, 662 F. Supp.
2d 1069 (N.D. Ind. 2009). For the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation’s order to consolidate and
transfer state cases to the Northern District of Indiana, see 381 F. Supp. 2d 1380 (Aug. 10, 2005).
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No. BC 210130, supra note 85.
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surely create a little financial empire under the aegis of [FedEx Ground].94

Indeed, the ability to tap into FedEx’s global client network formed the heart
of the company’s business plan when it took over RPS in 1998.95 In 1984, RPS
initiated the practice of having each P&D driver at its Fairfield, New Jersey
terminal sign a “Pick-Up [sic] and Delivery Contractor Operating Agreement.”96
RPS revised the form in 1994. At the time of the 2004 NLRB decision, FedEx
Ground had “agreements with approximately 8,600 P&D drivers [handling local
deliveries] and 1,300 linehaul drivers [covering inter-hub or long distance routes]”
system-wide.97 The agreement’s background statement indicated the contractual
intentions of the parties:
FedEx Ground wants to provide for package pick-up [sic] and delivery services
through a network of independent contractors, and, subject to the number of
packages tendered to FedEx Ground for shipment, will seek to manage its business
so that it can provide sufficient volume of packages to Contractor to make full use
of Contractor’s equipment. Contractor wants the advantage of operating within a
system that will provide access to national accounts and the benefits of added
revenues associated with shipments picked up and delivered by other contractors
throughout the FedEx Ground system. In order to get that advantage, Contractor is
willing to commit to provide daily pick-up [sic] and delivery service, and to
conduct his/her business so that it can be identified as being a part of the FedEx
Ground system. Both FedEx Ground and Contractor intend that Contractor will
provide these services strictly as an independent contractor and not as an employee
of FedEx Ground for any purpose. Therefore, this Agreement will set forth the
mutual business objectives of the two parties intended to be served by this
Agreement – which are the results the Contractor agrees to seek to achieve – but the
manner and means of reaching these results are within the discretion of the
Contractor, and no officer or employee of FedEx Ground shall have the authority to
impose any term or condition on Contractor or on Contractor’s continued operation
which is contrary to this understanding.98

FedEx Ground went beyond these contractual intentions, though, to
institute a compensation and bonus system for its P&D drivers. 99 The five
components of the system included: (1) a non-negotiable amount paid per
stop and per package handled; (2) a non-negotiable daily payment for
making a delivery truck and driver available to FedEx Ground; (3) monetary
inducements to encourage drivers to work in less densely populated areas;
(4) a “Flex Fee” program for drivers who were willing to take on additional
packages; and (5)
a Quarterly Performance Settlement under which P&D drivers with more than one
year of service can receive additional payment if they have performed their contract
obligations . . . . The quarterly payment can be taken in cash or put into an HR10

94
95
96
97
98
99

Id. at 17-18.
Case 22-RC-12508, supra note 85 at 10.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 9-10.
Id. at 34-37.
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retirement plan or into a Service Guarantee Account, a type of savings account. 100

Beyond the basic compensation for P&D drivers, FedEx Ground offered: (1)
“supplemental payments to drivers who use[d] ‘approved’ helpers[;]” (2) bonuses
to drivers who achieved individual customer service and safety goals and who
contributed to their terminal’s service goals; (3) a “Business Support Package”
(e.g., vehicle washing, scanner leasing, and uniform cleaning); (4) a “Time-Off
Program” in lieu of paid holidays or vacations; (5) interest-free loans for the first
thirteen weeks of a new P&D driver’s contract; (6) access to spare vehicles,
uniform rental, and vehicle maintenance; and (7) rewards for drivers who referred
new drivers to FedEx Ground. Linehaul drivers were eligible for similar
incentives.101
Rather than stepping back after specifying its requirements in the contract,
FedEx Ground added financial inducements and oversight mechanisms to
encourage loyalty and compliance. In a case similar to the Estrada case, JKH
Enterprises also had individuals sign agreements stating that they were
independent contractors.102 JKH Enterprises exercised less oversight of its
delivery drivers than did FedEx Ground. 103 Relying on precedent, the California
court applied the fourteen Borello factors104 and upheld the hearing officer’s
finding that the individuals were JKH Enterprises employees. The court ruled:
“[E]ven though there is an absence of control over the details, an employeeemployer relationship will be found if the [principal] retains pervasive control over
the operation as a whole, the worker’s duties are an integral part of the operation,
and the nature of the work makes detailed control unnecessary.”105
Thus, a contract’s wording alone is insufficient to distinguish between an

100

Id.
Id. at 37-42.
102
See JKH Enters., Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 563., (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
103
Id. at 569.
104
These factors substantially include:
(1) whether there is a right to fire at will without cause; (2) whether the one
performing services is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (3) the kind
of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done
under the direction of the principal or by a specialist with-out [sic] supervision;
(4) the skill required in the particular occupation; (5) whether the principal or the
worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person
doing the work; (6) the length of time for which the services are to be performed;
(7) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (8) whether or not
the work is a part of the regular business of the principal; (9) whether or not the
parties believe they are creating an employer-employee relationship; (10)
whether the classification of independent contractor is bona fide and not a
subterfuge to avoid employee status; (11) the hiree’s degree of investment other
than personal service in his or her own business and whether the hiree holds
himself or herself out to be in business with an independent business license; (12)
whether the hiree has employees; (13) the hiree’s opportunity for profit or loss
depending on his or her managerial skill; and (14) whether the service rendered is
an integral part of the alleged employer’s business.
Id. at 1064 n.14 (citing S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Ind. Relations, 769 P.2d 399 (Cal.
1989)).
105
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101

108

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW

Vol. IV:I

employee and an independent contractor. Courts look at the nature of a business’
operations. Both employees and contractors may be essential to a firm’s
operations, but each should be accorded different treatment under the law. Not
every state uses the IRS’ twenty factors or Borello’s fourteen factors. For
example, in the next case, Fleece on Earth, Vermont’s Department of Labor uses
only a three factor test, but both parties differ over how to characterize the degree
of control exercised by the business owner. 106
Fleece on Earth
Fleece on Earth is a Vermont retailer of hand-knitted and hand-sewn
children’s clothing and gifts.107 Bonny Dutton, Fleece on Earth’s owner, started
the enterprise because she loves to design. 108 “[U]nfortunately that’s the smallest
part of the business at this point in time because of all the other duties [she has] as
a retailer.”109 Individual knitters and sewers working out of their homes produce
the goods in the stage between the goods’ design and distribution.110 In January
2005, the Unemployment Insurance Division of the Department of Employment &
Training assessed Fleece on Earth $295.04 in interest and penalties for
contributions on behalf of seven knitters and sewers whom Fleece on Earth had
considered to be independent contractors.111 Fleece on Earth appealed, but an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) upheld the assessment.112 The Vermont
Employment Security Board (“ESB”) upheld the ALJ’s decision, but reversed
some of the ALJ’s conclusions.113 The case was appealed to the Vermont Supreme
Court, who affirmed the rulings below in a split decision. 114
Vermont’s ABC Test for identifying independent contractors is the focal
point of the case.115 After the State establishes that individuals perform services
for wages,116 the business owner must demonstrate that the individuals are
independent contractors via a three-prong test:117 first (“A”), the individual must
be “free from control or direction over performance of the service;”118 second
(“B”), the individual’s service must be outside of the usual course or places of the
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Fleece on Earth v. Dep’t of Employment & Training, 923 A.2d 594 (Vt. 2007).
Id. at 596.
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Transcript of Record at 17-18, In Re Fleece on Earth, Appeal No. C-02-05-172-01 (Vt. Dep’t of
Employment & Training Office of Admin. Hearings May 25, 2005), 17-18 [hereinafter ALJ Transcript].
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Brief of Appellee at 3, Fleece on Earth v. Vt. Dep’t of Labor, 923 A.2d 594 (2007) (No. 05367), 2005 WL 4905734, at *3 [hereinafter Appellee’s Brief].
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In re Fleece on Earth, Appeal No. C-02-05-172-01 (Vt. Dep’t of Employment & Training
Office of Admin. Hearings May 25, 2005) [hereinafter ESB Decision].
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Fleece on Earth, 923 A.2d at 602.
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21 VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 21 § 1301(6)(B) (2009).
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Id. at § 1301(12).
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business doing the contracting;119 and third (“C”), the individual must be
“customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation,
profession, or business.”120 Failure to prevail on any prong renders the individual
an employee.121
Taking the prongs in reverse order, for test C, specific contentions have
revolved around missing information for two of the seven individuals who knitted
or sewed for Fleece on Earth.122 The State claims that:
[Fleece on Earth] did not present sufficient evidence showing that either [two of the
seven individuals] had independently established sewing or knitting businesses . . .
[Fleece on Earth] did not show that either worker had an established, stable,
ongoing business providing knitting or sewing services for others at the same time
they provided those services to [Fleece on Earth].123

Fleece on Earth argues that the State’s (and the ALJ’s) position: 1) has no
foundation in the statute’s text, and 2) implies that an individual cannot hold two
roles simultaneously.124 Supporting multiple clients also suggests a minimal size
of operation that could discourage individuals from innovating and exclude
contractors who prefer to work exclusively for one client.125 The organization of
Fleece on Earth’s business and of the individuals’ work leads to B and A.
For B, the ALJ found that both Fleece on Earth and the individuals supplied
handcrafted garments, i.e., engaged in the same course of business. 126 But
contrary to the ALJ,127 the ESB held that Fleece on Earth passed B because
“services performed in an individual’s home are not to be considered to have been
performed within the usual places of business of the employer.”128 These general
observations about the respective functions of Fleece on Earth and the individuals
ignore both the perceptions that Bonny and the knitters/sewers had about their
roles and the nature of the production process. That process and the control over it
are at the heart of A.
Both the ALJ and ESB held that Fleece on Earth failed A because Bonny: 1)
retained the right to exert actual control over the knitters and sewers; 2) provided
yarn for knitting, material for sewing, and patterns for every item; and 3) paid only
upon inspection of the final goods – thereby implying that knitters and sewers
lacked discretion to deviate from the designated materials and patterns. 129 Fleece
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ALJ Transcript, supra note 108 at 5, and ESB Decision, supra note 112 at 6. The ESB
emphasized the nationwide consistency of decision with respect to knitters, sewers, and other home
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on Earth challenges the ALJ and ESB holdings on A by emphasizing Fleece on
Earth’s lack of control over the individuals’ performance versus the ALJ’s and
ESB’s focus on Fleece on Earth’s control over the resulting products.130 Fleece on
Earth cites factors such as the individuals’ ownership of the production equipment
and the individuals’ complete discretion over hours worked, techniques used,
assistants employed, scheduling, and sequencing. 131
A could also be viewed from the perspective of a value-added chain,
separating different steps of the production process. Bonny’s testimony before the
ALJ, describes how she views her roles as designer and seller with the individuals
forming the intermediate production stage:
Bonny: “I probably add four new items to my line each year. I am not a sewing or
knitting contractor . . . . [N]o one comes to my business looking to have anything
sewn or knitted.”
Q: “So they come to you to buy clothes? . . . And the clothes are put together based
on your designs by these folks?”
Bonny: “Yes.”132

Thus, customers view Bonny and Fleece on Earth as a source for finished
clothing based on Bonny’s designs. The clothing is assembled based on the
designs by individuals who then invoice Bonny at the agreed upon price for the
finished items.133 Bonny herself does not engage in actual production. 134 Indeed,
when asked what her business would be if she did not have the individual knitters
and sewers, Bonny responded that she guessed she would continue to be a retailerseller, possibly buying from other established children’s clothing lines.135 At no
point does Bonny aver that she would herself engage in production.
The disjunctive nature of Bonny’s business plan and organization – with her
handling the beginning and end functions of design and distribution – hearkens
back to the inside contract system that characterized U.S. manufacturing before
World War I and stands in marked contrast to the types of cases relied on by the
State in its appellee brief. The inside contract system was configured as follows:
The gap between raw material and finished product was filled not by paid
employees . . . but by contractors, to whom the production job was delegated. They
[the contractors] hired their own employees, supervised the work process, and

and agency theory) and states that follow the “‘control or direction’ element of the ABC test.”
Appellee’s Brief, supra note 111 at 13-14. Specifically, the State argues that the Vermont Supreme
Court has not followed a “strict common law approach.” Id. at 13. The examples that the State cites
include adjunct college faculty, auto repossessers, and house cleaners, Id. at 14-15, and sound similar to
the California holding in JKH Enterprises, HORNE, supra note 50, wherein lack of detailed control did
not preclude individuals from being classified as employees.
130
Appellee’s Brief, supra note 111 at 4, 11.
131
Brief for New England Legal Found. & Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. Legal Found. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Appellee, supra note 85, at 9-10 (citing A.L.J. Tr. at 18, 25, & exhibits).
132
ALJ Transcript, supra note 108, at 18.
133
Id. at 18, 22.
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Id. at 29-30.
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received a piece rate from the company for completed goods . . . . The company’s
largest single expense was the amount paid to the contractors for finished goods. 136

Reduced costs brought about by the advent of the assembly line and
Frederick Taylor’s principles of “scientific management” offer one explanation for
the demise of inside contracting by large enterprises in the early twentieth
century.137 Nevertheless, “outside” contracting with independent service providers
remained a viable alternative for businesses of all sizes.
With inside contracting in the late nineteenth century, “skilled workers in
industries such as iron production controlled the management of the production
process, contracting with the firm’s owners only for the total tonnage of iron to be
produced and the tonnage rate.”138 The business configuration for the early iron
works and for Fleece on Earth is the same in that each owner contracted for the
essential intermediate stage of production and paid on a per unit rate. A newspaper
account of a 1914 case suggests that courts upheld the primacy of such contracts:
The Appellate Division dismissed yesterday the appeal of Henry Brody and
Hyman Punt, makers of skirts at Passaic, from a $1,500 judgment in favor of
Benjamin Schlossberg, a sub-contractor. Schlossberg was an inside contractor
who produced the skirts in the Brody & Punt factory under a piece work system
while they were in business in New York. When they went to Passaic they asked
him to reduce his prices per skirt, because labor was cheaper in Passaic, but he
insisted on his former contract price and they put him out.139
As modern U.S. manufacturing evolved and workers’ rights expanded after
World War I, employment laws increasingly wrestled with the question of which
party should bear responsibility for the individual’s economic security. In Fleece
on Earth’s appeal, the State cites Andrews v. Commodore Knitting Mills for the
holding that New York’s unemployment compensation laws covered home knitters
using their own equipment, but not employer-supplied raw materials.140 However,
Commodore supplemented its factory production with outsourcing (rather than
being wholly dependent upon it) and sent raw materials as well as samples of the
finished products to the homeworkers. 141 Fleece on Earth had no factory and sent
only designs for knitting and pre-cut material for sewing to the homeworkers. By
suggesting a source of yarn supply, Fleece on Earth had done nothing more than
pre-inspect the yarn that it recommended, but did not require, its home knitters to
use. Most importantly, the production techniques remained solely within the
discretion of Fleece on Earth’s home knitters and sewers.
Unlike FedEx Ground, which contracted with individuals and then continued
to introduce additional inducements and control mechanisms, Fleece on Earth
136
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contracted with individuals and stepped back until it was time for inspection per
the initial agreement.142 Although Fleece on Earth contracted for an essential
segment of its operations, Fleece on Earth had no way to compel the knitters and
sewers to perform, other than to withhold payment.143 The knitters and sewers
retained freedom of choice over how and when to offer their services and to offer
those services exclusively to Fleece on Earth or to multiple buyers.144 Had Fleece
on Earth breached its agreement, the knitters and sewers could have taken Fleece
on Earth to court. This distinction between a business owner that continues its
oversight function versus one that steps back is at the heart of the proposal for a
workable standard to define independent contractors.
IV. PROPOSAL
FedEx Ground and Fleece on Earth both relied on individuals contracting
with the respective firms to provide essential services. Adjudications in both cases
were based upon the nature and the conditions of the work being done. Having a
contract identifying individuals as independent contractors was insufficient to
thwart rulings that the firms had misclassified individuals. Early inside contracts
upheld by courts specified price and quantity required by the employer. Thus, a
clear definition of independent contractor entails not only the title of “independent
contractor” but contains some indication of planning by the business owner.
Several industries, such as construction and delivery services, have persistent
misclassifications. For example, the Construction Policy Research Center, part of
the Labor and Worklife Program of Harvard’s Schools of Law and Public Health,
has issued two reports. Both reports estimate that one in seven construction
employers in Maine and Massachusetts misclassified workers as independent
contractors over the years 1999-2002 and 2001-2003, respectively.145 The Harvard
studies prompted calls for a study by the Government Accountability Office. The
Government Accountability Office has focused on increasing independent
contractor compliance with IRS requirements. 146 Enforcement, though, is a
separate issue from that of the initial classification. Indeed, the Government
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Accountability Office’s endorsement of clearer reporting requirements for
employers – both to the IRS and to the employee/independent contractor – would
be strengthened by a clear definition of employee versus independent contractor.
To that end, this article proposes a single-factor “step-back” test.
A. The Step-Back Test
We propose that each state and those federal government agencies, including
the IRS, that are required to distinguish between employees and independent
contractors adopt a single-factor “step-back” test. The proposed step-back test
would ask, “[d]oes the employer exert any control over the arrangement apart from
(1) providing an initial list of specific expectations for the outcome (product to be
provided or task to be performed) and (2) inspecting and accepting the goods or
services provided?” In the case of FedEx Ground, the answer would be “yes”
because the employer (1) continued to oversee the actual provision of the delivery
services and (2) offered additional inducements for performance, such as rewards
for meeting periodic service goals – goals that would be determined unilaterally by
FedEx Ground.147 In the case of Fleece on Earth, the answer would be “no”
because the employer (1) presented a list of requirements for the final product and
stepped back until the inspection and (2) made no further intrusions into the
“production process” until inspection and the decision to accept the goods.148
Two related questions concern (1) company recommendations regarding
materials and supplies to be used and (2) modifications to or anticipated periodic
review of the contract. Under the step-back test, FedEx Ground would be able to
offer its Business Support Package and Fleece on Earth would be able to
recommend brands or sellers of yarn. FedEx Ground’s negotiating clout with truck
washes and service providers and Fleece on Earth’s knowledge of yarn quality are
assets of those respective businesses. However, FedEx Ground took a big step
toward treating individuals as employees when the firm offered a variety of
bonuses for meeting company determined targets and supplemental payments for
hiring approved drivers.149 These measures were tantamount to continuous
monitoring because the individual’s choice of action would depend upon the firm’s
anticipated response rather than the individual’s judgment regarding whether the
action would achieve the stated objective. At Fleece on Earth, on the other hand,
knitters were free to accept or reject the terms of the arrangement and to complete
the work at their own pace.150
What about changes of circumstances, repetitive tasks, or long-term projects
where a business justifiably would want to receive periodic updates and retain the
ability to make mid-course adjustments? Changed circumstances, impracticability,
and impossibility are all established areas of contract law. The step-back test
focuses on the nature of the contract. Thus, a business could use independent
contractors for repetitive tasks or for long-term projects as long as the contract
147
148
149
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specified discrete phases. For example, a firm hiring a computer consultant to
streamline financial reporting “as needed” is too vague, implies a lack of freedom
on the part of the consultant, and approximates an on-call employee. The firm
would need to delineate its objectives by department, type of report, or other
criteria and then step back until it is time to evaluate the independent contractor’s
work.
The firm, the individual, and an independent reviewer should be able to
visualize a decision tree where the individual and firm interact at each node (i.e.,
evaluate task completion and agree upon the next objective), but the individual
alone moves along the project path.151 Thus, Bonny Dutton sees her knitters at the
time of contract formation and when the products are ready for inspection. If
Fleece on Earth knitters fail to perform, they do not get paid. If Fleece on Earth
knitters do deliver products and are paid, then both Fleece on Earth and the knitter
know that the knitter has earned taxable income. Hence, the proposed step-back
test complements the Government Accountability Office’s recommendations for
clarifying the individual’s status ex ante. A remaining issue, though, concerns
retroactive investigations of and fines for past misclassifications.
B. No Retroactivity
Although businesses have an obvious inclination toward preferring the lower
costs and liability associated with independent contractors (versus employees), all
businesses have a strong desire for a clear legal standard. Another concern is the
retroactive application of whichever standard is adopted. Based on surveys of its
600,000+ membership, the National Federation of Independent Business (“NFIB”)
testified before Congress about the costs that retroactive investigations and rulings
by the IRS pose on small business owners. 152
The definitional and retroactivity issues were the top recommendations for
Congress made by the 1995 White House Conference on Small Business. 153 The
issues were still salient in the Small Business Administration’s (“SBA’s”) 2000
final report on implementation of the 1995 recommendations.154
Although employers have a legal economic incentive for not classifying
individuals as employees, businesses and the courts recognize the need for a
bright-line rule. “[FedEx Ground] needs a ‘bright line’ in order to conduct its
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business as to the status of its workers.”155 The step-back test offers such a line
and one that could be applied without imposing an undue retroactive burden on
business or on individuals.
C. Alternatives and Potential Objections
The step-back test would meet the needs of workers and business owners
alike better than proposed alternatives.
Senate Bill 2044, proposed by then-Senator Barack Obama (IL), offers one
such alternative.156 Obama’s bill would alter the IRS’ current approach to
independent classification in three key ways. First, S. 2044 requires employers to
treat workers misclassified as independent contractors as employees for
employment tax purposes.157 Second, it repeals a ban on Treasury regulations or
revenue rulings on employee/independent contractor classification issues.158 Third,
it eliminates the defense of “industry practice” as a justification for misclassifying
workers as independent contractors.159
S. 2044 might reduce uncertainty about particular workers’ statuses;
however, it reduces uncertainty by restructuring the rules so that nearly all workers
are treated as employees. Such a result is undesirable for several reasons. First,
giving current independent contractors the full panoply of employee rights does
not come without cost. Some employers, rather than bear these additional costs,
might simply choose not to hire as many workers as before. 160 This would hardly
be a desirable outcome for employees, workers, or consumers who benefit from
innovative business practices. Second, some available data indicates that the
overwhelming majority of independent contractors are happy with their current
employment conditions.161
Advocates of S. 2044 and measures like it often contend that the current
system too easily allows employers to evade federal and state anti-discrimination
laws.162 Some recent scholarship, however, has outlined promising alternative
legal remedies to these problems.163 Courts that implement these suggestions may
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offer wronged independent contractors some relief, while still allowing other
employers and independent contractors to reap the benefits of non-traditional
employment relationships.
V.

CONCLUSION

Businesses worldwide are experimenting with flexible work arrangements.
Successful use of independent contractors blurs the distinction between permanent
core and contingent peripheral workers because business owners seek to have all
participants functioning as an integrated unit. The ILO proposal for a presumption
in favor of employee status (versus independent contractor) is one way to combat
disguised employment relationships, but it still relies on relevant indicators that
must be balanced and does nothing to alleviate the business owner’s liability for a
well-reasoned misclassification.
The IRS’ 20-factor test, among others, is costly in terms of compliance and
litigation.164 Not only can reasonable minds offer competing and valid
justifications for each factor, but different agencies at the federal and state levels
use different factors. The quest for a clear legal standard has been a prominent
issue for businesses for over twenty years. The Government Accountability
Office’s July 2006 recommendation to notify every federal and state agency of a
misclassification under the FLSA fails to address the problem of dueling factors.165
In the U.S., the philosophies of the broad, employment protection policies of
the New Deal at the federal level conflict with the narrow, focused emphases on
employment-at-will and freedom-to-contract traditionally found at the state level.
Organizations such as the National Employment Law Project (“NELP”) caution
against “laws that pertain to ‘simplify’ the myriad definitions of ‘employee’ or
‘independent contractor’ under state labor and employment laws.”166 Contrary to
NELP’s assertion that “factors . . . are manipulable [sic] by employers,”167 factors
hurt both employers and individuals. The FedEx Ground and Fleece on Earth
cases illustrate the problems with factor tests. The proposed step-back test offers a
clear legal standard.
The step-back test would label an individual as an employee if the employer
exercised any control over the individual’s actions between the formation of the
contract and evaluation of interim or final results. The employer would be free to
set detailed specifications and to share knowledge with individuals, but would have
to step back from attempting to influence the individual’s decisions regarding how
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the task or project would be accomplished. Incentives for early completion by
independent contractors would be allowed if included in the initial agreement.
Side payments, such as perpetual eligibility for bonuses or incentives, would be
indicative of control and classify the individual as an employee.
This is not a question of one business model being good or bad, but of
providing businesses, individuals, and agencies with a clear standard for
distinguishing between employees and independent contractors. Employees tend
to be costlier for firms and to subject firms to greater legal liability than do
independent contractors, but the ease and cost of misclassification are also
expensive – particularly when the penalties are assessed retroactively. The stepback test provides an easily administered standard that preserves the freedom of
businesses to organize their operations as they see fit and of individuals to choose
their conditions of employment.

